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 This thesis contributes to the literature of economics of small-scale fishery 
communities and fishery management in developing nations. In the first section we 
review literature on state of the fishery resource and the livelihoods in the globe and 
performance of fishery management systems in developing and developed countries. 
Second section discusses the results of an empirical study on the economics of 
subsistence fishers in Digha-Shankarpur in Eastern India. Results of the empirical 
study shows by-catch by the trawlers leads to the depletion of target fish stock of the 
subsistence fishers. Underutilization of the capacity by the subsistence fishers due to 
the lack of fish stock leads to income losses and inequitable profit distributions among 
fishers. Ultimately, lack of fish stock generates competition among subsistence 
fishers. Given the identified economic conditions of fishers from the survey and the 
literature on ecological studies, we focus on policy measures which can tackle the 
dual problem of resource depletion and unsustainable competitive pressures on the 
small-scale fishers. To this end in the third section we present a general scenario 
analysis concerning the welfare of industry participants when there is a well-defined 
rights based fishery management policy in place. To support the policy design we 
extensively study the Digha industry setting and the status quo management of Digha 
fishery. Given the heterogeneity of fishers and the segmented markets in Digha 
 
 
fishery and the conflicts of interests among fisher groups, we consider two TAC 
policy designs to regulate two segmented markets namely, trawler boat fishers and 
subsistence fishers. According to the scenario analysis, two TACs for subsistence and 
trawler boat fishers with an ITQ system is a better fit to achieve the sustainability 
goals of the Digha fishery. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the TAC policy on 
trawlers depends on the magnitude of by-catch reduction. Also, the policy 
implementation is critical due to the poverty conditions in the developing countries. 
However, this study makes a case for policy makers and researchers to carry out an 
informed cost benefit analysis in implementing a TAC-ITQ policy in a developing 
country fishery setting. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation 
 Fish is a primary healthy protein source for people around the world. With the 
population and continuous global demand for fish, fisheries worldwide have become a 
source of income for millions of households. According to the 2014 annual 
publication of Fishery and Aquaculture Statistics (published by FAO-Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations), “20 percent of average per capita 
intake of animal proteins is supplemented by fish for more than 3.1 billion people in 
the globe”. Available data shows a further growth in per capita fish consumption 
(Figure 1.1) which has been supported by a continued growth of global fish 
production to approximately 93.4 million tons in 2014. From this total capture 81.5 
million tons was from marine waters and 11.9 million tons was from inland waters 
(FAO publication, 2016). This continually increasing fish demand by a growing 
global population implies that there is a huge challenge of feeding our planet while 
preventing overfishing of fish stocks and safeguarding these stocks for future 
generations.  
 
 
Figure 1.1: World Fish Utilization and Supply 
Source: The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture (FAO Publication, 2016) 
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 Sustainable fishing is thus a key issue globally, especially for countries and 
communities where fish is an essential part of the diet and fishing an important source 
of income. In order to serve the demand for fish and ensure sustainability of fish 
stocks, there is also an increased production of fish from aquaculture. In 2014 
aquaculture production accounted for 73.8 million tons (FAO publication, 2016). The 
fishing sector also provides jobs to tens of millions of people in developing nations 
(FAO, 2014). Fish is also one of the most-traded food commodities worldwide. 
Especially in developing countries, fish contributes to a notable increase in foreign 
currency earnings. The global fish exports in developing countries accounted for 
about “54 percent by value and 60 percent by quantity (live weight equivalent) in 
2014”. Compared to other agricultural commodities (rice, coffee, tea), net exports of 
fish in developing countries have shown a significant increase. For instance, “USD 16 
billion in 1994 to USD 20 billion in 2004 and USD 42 billion in 2014”(FAO 
publication, 2014).  
 India is a large developing nation which depends on and contributes to the 
fishery industry. Indian fish production has increased from “0.75 million tons in 1950-
51 to 9.6 million tons during 2012–13” (4.5 percent average annual growth rate). 
Increased fish production reflects the importance of this sector to the national GDP 
and the domestic population (in terms of serving their nutritional needs). Also, foreign 
exchange earnings from commercial fishing activities in India accounted for US$ 3.51 
billion in 2012–13 (FAO, 2014). All these reasons illustrate the importance of the 
sector on India’s economy and in providing livelihood. Thus, it is important to ensure 
that sustainable fisheries management and environmental well-being is compatible 
with fish demand and human well-being for long-term sustainable development. To 
this end, promoting sustainable fisheries is an important challenge.  
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 In this research, we focus on the issue of marine fisheries management. 
Fisheries management in general and marine fisheries management in particular is 
challenged by the fact that fishery is a common pool resource and hence can lead to 
the tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968).Tragedy of the commons is a “market 
failure that stems from overusing an open access resource because of poorly defined 
property rights”. In fisheries, individuals act independently and according to their 
self-interests, and harvest at rates far greater than the Maximum Sustainable Yield 
(MSY-largest catch that can be constantly sustained without outside influences) 
leading to resource depletion. Such market failure from tragedy of the commons is 
common in developing countries where property rights for the fishing resources are 
not well defined (FAO, accessed 2017). 
 Fishery management is also challenged by Illegal, Unreported, and 
Unregulated (IUU) fishing. The FAO defines IUU fishing “as activities which include 
fishing and fishing-related activities conducted in contravention of national, regional 
and international laws, non-reporting, misreporting or under- reporting of information 
on fishing operations and their catches, fishing by “Stateless” vessels, fishing in 
convention areas of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs) by non-
party vessels and fishing activities which are not regulated by states and cannot be 
easily monitored and accounted for”. According to the FAO, IUU fishing occurs due 
to weak fishery management regimes and poor monitoring and administration 
processes (FAO, 2016). Poor management can threaten the sustainable fisheries 
management and negatively impact the livelihoods of people dependent on it. In 
developing countries which lack capacity and resources for effective monitoring, 
control, and surveillance, the problem of IUU fishing can be very severe.  
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 Other than the management failures, introduction of mechanized fishing boats 
and deep sea trawlers and the adverse fisher behaviors drive fish stock depletion. The 
competition generated by these fisher groups threaten the local communities whose 
livelihoods depend on the fisheries and the greater ecosystem. These issues have 
made it necessary to enact legislation for regulation of fishery industry, especially in 
developing nations while recognizing the situations specific to these nations such as 
limited government resources, large and low income coastal fishing population etc. 
 In many developed countries (such as New Zealand, USA, Australia), 
regulators have implemented well defined fishery rights systems such as TAC (Total 
Allowable Catch) combined with ITQs (Individual Tradable Quotas). TAC is a limit 
on total harvest by the fishers below the status quo levels of harvest. ITQs give TAC 
shares or quotas to each fisher and allow fishers to trade their quotas with each other. 
These policies help in reducing overfishing and ITQs reduce the race for catch by the 
fishers which contributes to sustainable fishery management goals.  
 These policies however often involve high cost of implementation and 
monitoring. In developing countries however, regional and local governments often 
lack the financial resources and management personnel needed to assess the 
biological and economical state of the fisheries and the communities that depends on 
the fisheries for their livelihood. Thus, even when developing nations have fisheries 
regulations in place, lack of resources prevents effective implementation. Within such 
an impoverished setting, economic conditions of small-scale fishing communities can 
further worsen amidst increasing conflicts between fisher groups competing to harvest 
from the same fishery. 
 To this end, researchers have assessed the impact of prevailing co-
management systems (sharing of responsibility and authority between the state and 
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resource-users) of fishery resources in developing countries using meta-analysis 
approaches to identify the gaps in prevailing management systems (Evans et al., 2011; 
Allison and Ellis, 2001; Knowler et al., 2009). According to the findings in the 
literature, co-management has its pros and cons. They also found that the absence of 
well-defined markets and property rights is also a key reason for overfishing and 
mismanagement of fish stock. However, there are not many studies related to 
economic analysis of introducing well-defined property rights in developing country 
fishery contexts (Isaacs, 2011; Hersoug, 2011). 
 In this context, we study the Digha-Shankarpur marine fishery in the Eastern 
Indian state of West Bengal to identify how the gaps in management of fishery 
resources affect the fishery, the ecosystem and livelihoods of fishing community in 
developing countries. This fishery is one of the important contributors to the West 
Bengal fishing industry. However, recent biological and ecological studies indicate 
that fishery resource in West Bengal is under the threat of depletion (Das et al., 2010). 
Thus, there is a need to introduce legislation to manage fishery resources. For this 
purpose, results of extant biological and ecological studies needs to be supplemented 
by socio-economic studies of the fishing community who are dependent on the 
resource and whose actions impact its sustainable availability. Moreover, the Digha 
context also allows us to understand how the poverty levels interact with local fishery 
industry organization in developing nations to influence the design and effective 
implementation of a well-defined fishery management policy. 
 
1.2 Objectives 
 The first objective of this study is to identify the threats to the eco-system and 
subsistence fishing communities in developing nations from fish stock depletion, 
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using an empirical study conducted in Digha-Shankarpur marine fishery. We present 
socio economic information about the subsistence fishing community, as well as 
information about the fishing fleet, production, earnings, savings, fishing efforts and 
perceptions of these fishers regarding environmental threats.  
 Second, we present information on the status of prevailing management 
system and the industry organization of Digha setting as a support for the policy 
design and analysis. We conduct a general scenario analysis concerning the welfare 
impacts for fishery industry participants (subsistence fishers, trawlers and briefly the 
middlemen) of developing country heterogeneous fisheries resembling the Digha 
fishery under a TAC and TAC-ITQ policy. I focus on three situations;  
i) Discuss welfare effects in the absence of any policy i.e. status quo 
ii) Introduce TAC and discuss how this is (or is it) better relative to (i) 
iii) Introduce TAC with ITQ and discuss how this is better (or not) relative to (i) 
and (ii).  
 Moving forward the policy objective of this study is to communicate the 
research findings with the West Bengal Marine Fisheries Department to enable them 
to make an informed decision about implementing a fishery policy given the available 
resources and political background in the region, to ensure sustainable stock 
management and economic development.  
 The economic analysis of the Digha fishers contributes to the literature on the 
economic conditions of fishers in developing nations. Identification of the economic 
conditions of fishers supports the management of fishery resource, fishing 
communities and effective policy implication. In addition, this research will also 
contribute to the broader literature on assessment and performance of well-defined 
fishery rights systems in managing fishery in developing nations. Moreover, this 
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research contributes to the literature on policy design, analysis and implication given 
different contexts. For instance, this research focuses on heterogeneous and 
segmented markets in Digha and poverty conditions of developing nations. In this 
regard, this study is expected to be of interest to both policy makers and researchers 
alike.  
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Fishery Management in Theory and in Practice 
2.1.1 A simple model of fisheries  
 Before identifying the economic implications of fishery management, it is 
important to know the biological aspects of fisheries. Tietenberg and Lewis (2009) 
explained the characters of the fishery using the basic bio economic model proposed 
by Schaefer (1957). Schaefer model explains the relationship between effort and 
harvest given the growth rate of the fish population (y-axis) and the size of the fish 
population (x-axis) (Figure 2.1).  
 The graph indicates that growth rate increases as the population increases from 
ܵ to ܵ∗ and beyond this point population growth decreases as the population increases 
till ܵ. At both ܵ and ܵ the growth of fish stock is zero. Here ܵ is called as “natural 
equilibrium”. Natural equilibrium is the population size that would persist in the 
absence of outside influences and it is a stable equilibrium (natural equilibrium is also 
known as carrying capacity). ܵ is known as the “minimum viable population”. When 
the population falls below ܵ, the growth rate becomes negative and the population 
starts to deplete. 
 
Figure 2.1: Relationship between the Fish Population (Stock) and Growth  
Source: Tietenberg and Lewis (2009, p. 322) 
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When the catch/harvest level is equal to the growth rate of the population, harvest is 
said to occur at the rate of the sustainable yield since the stock can be maintained 
forever. For an example the catch (sustainable yield) at stock ܵ଴ is ܩ(ܵ଴). Catch levels 
exceeding the sustainable level results in short-term increases of net benefits but 
jeopardizes future catch sizes since the fish stock gets reduced to a size not big 
enough to reproduce back to its original population.ܵ∗ is the stock corresponding to 
the “Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY)” which is the highest growth. Thus, the 
MSY is the “largest catch that can be perpetually sustained in the absence of outside 
disturbances” (Tietenberg and Lewis, 2009).  
 However, the MSY is not the economically efficient yield. Efficiency is 
maximizing the net benefit from the use of the resource (Tietenberg and Lewis, 2009) 
and the yield value corresponding to this is termed the “Efficient Sustainable Yield”.  
 
 
Figure 2.2: Efficient Sustainable Yield for Fishery 
Source: Tietenberg and Lewis (2009, p. 324) 
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 In Figure 2.2, quantity of fishing effort is represented on the x-axis and the 
benefits and costs of fishing effort are represented on the y-axis. ܧ௘  is the efficient 
level of effort (where marginal benefit equals marginal cost). Thus, efficient level of 
effort is less than the effort at MSY (ܧ௠). However, with advance technology, 
marginal cost of extraction decreases and the total cost curve rotates right. With this 
new cost structure, both efficient level of effort and the efficient sustainable yield 
increases beyond the sustainable yield at ܧ௘. This increase in effort and catch 
increases the net benefit for fishers. It is important to note that the expected results of 
these models were given under the constant prices and constant marginal cost of 
harvesting. However, there are other constraints which we should take into account. 
First, “marginal harvesting costs are typically not constant, but rather increase as the 
remaining stock size diminishes”. Second, “the basic model holds fish price constant, 
but the size of the harvest can affect prices; larger harvests can depress prices” 
(Tietenberg and Lewis, 2009). 
 In the open access fishery as property rights are not well-defined for the 
fishers, no one can exclude others from getting access to the common pool fishery 
resource. This situation leads to more fishers entering the fishery and they operate 
where average revenue equals average cost (zero profits) by exerting more effort. 
Figure 2.3 shows the open access effort level (ܧ௖) compared to the efficient level of 
effort (ܧ௘). Open access fishery creates two kinds of costs: a simultaneous external 
cost and an intergenerational external cost (Tietenberg and Lewis, 2009). The 
simultaneous external cost results from overcapitalization of the fishery owing to the 
presence of too many boats and fishers so that individual returns are lowered.  
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Figure 2.3: Open Access Fishery Outcome 
Source: Tietenberg and Lewis (2009, p. 328) 
 
The intergenerational external cost occurs owing to long term stock reduction from 
overfishing which, in turn, lowers profits from fishing due to the low harvest levels. 
Low stocks over a sustained period of time combined with an effort of  ܧ௖ leads to a 
situation where fishers are not able to harvest the catch corresponding to this effort 
level leading to economic inefficiencies. In this condition fishers exert too much 
effort to catch too few fish. To overcome the problem of overfishing, to eliminate the 
competition and to increase the efficiency gains among fishers, fishery management 
policies are necessary. However, the implementations of these policies are based on 
resource availability. This is especially true for developing nations. 
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2.1.2 Institutions and regulations to manage fishery industry 
2.1.2.1 Co-management: 
 Co-management of fisheries is an important approach to manage the resource 
especially in developing country fisheries (FAO, accessed 2017). Evans et al. (2011) 
describes co-management “as the sharing of responsibility and authority between the 
state and resource-users but often involves collaboration between a variety of 
stakeholders, including different government agencies, non-governmental 
organizations, research organizations, private enterprises and civil society more 
generally”. Co-management includes mechanisms such as “power sharing, institution 
building, enhanced trust and social capital, problem solving and, more recently, 
knowledge-sharing and social learning” (FAO, accessed 2017). Thus, the basic 
principle behind co-management is “Community based management”. Studies 
indicate that factors such as a community's shared norms and values which define the 
relationships between members, use of shaming against defectors from the norms and 
values and reciprocity facilitate coordination of behaviors across different groups of 
people for effective natural resources management (Taylor, 1982; Haward et al., 
2000).  
 
2.1.2.2 Property rights and fisheries management: 
 Assigning “property rights” to fishers is an important management policy to 
regulate the over-use of open access fishery resources. The use of “property rights” or 
“user rights” can refer to “different bundles of entitlements – privileges and 
responsibilities assigned to fishers regarding the use of fishery resources” (FAO, 
accessed 2017). While co-management is based on formal rules which rely on 
legislation or regulatory instruments, assigning property rights leads to the creation of 
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a market with the government involved in ensuring that the rights are not violated and 
strictly enforced. Use of property rights in management of fishery is called “rights 
based management system”. Assigning property rights involves four main criteria 
(FAO, 2017). 
 Security- Allocation of secure property rights implies that fishers’ access and 
use of their property cannot be challenged by other individuals. 
 Durability- This refers to the duration of the property right. 
 Transferability- This refers to the possibility of property rights/entitlements 
being transferred (traded) to another property holder. 
 Exclusivity- This refers to the ways in which property right holders manage 
and trade their property rights. 
 There are different ways in which property rights for fishing resources are 
defined and distributed. Some policies consider the aggregate benefit to the eco-
system while others consider benefits to individual fishers as well. Based on these 
benefits/incentives to those involved in fishery, the main types of rights based fishery 
management schemes that are currently in use are TACs, IQs and ITQs (FAO, 2017). 
Developed nations like New Zealand, Australia, USA, Canada, and Iceland have 
extensively implemented fishery management plans through the use of TAC, IQ and 
ITQ regimes. 
 
Total Allowable Catch (TAC): 
 The total allowable catch “is a catch limit set for a particular fishery, generally 
for a year or a fishing season and is usually expressed in tons of live-weight 
equivalent, but is sometimes set in terms of numbers of fish” (FAO, 2017). TAC 
limits the cap on fishing and is assigned by the specific government bodies related to 
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fishery management in each country/continent. For an example in Europe TACs 
are set annually for most stocks by the Council of Fisheries Ministers (European 
Commission, accessed 2017). TACs are concerned with ensuring that total fish 
landings don’t go beyond the catch limit. They do not focus on the harvest behavior of 
individual fishers post implementation.  
 
Individual Quota (IQ) and Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ): 
 IQs divide the total annual catch quota (TAC) into individual quota allocations 
which are then distributed to the fishers. Thus, IQs are also termed “TAC shares” 
(Arnason, 1993). IQs are an effective policy since fishers get security by holding on to 
their property rights to fish without being challenged by other fishers and that 
eliminates the incentives to race for fish. However, IQs do not provide incentives to 
reduce the existing overcapacity of the fleet that is driven by low fish stocks (FAO, 
2017). As a result, fishery policy has moved to the implementation of ITQs which 
gives incentives to fishers to manage their resources efficiently. ITQs are tradable and 
fishers can decide to sell/buy/lease quota depend on how much they want to 
participate in the fishery. Tradability of ITQs helps fishers to manage their resources 
efficiently while releasing the harvesting pressure on the fish stock. The allocation 
criteria for ITQs may be based on the historical catch of vessels and with the goal of 
benefitting current active fishing vessel owners (FAO, 2017).  
 Thus, there are many policies and regulatory processes to manage fisheries. 
However, the applications of those policies are context specific. For example, the 
extent of by-catch, discards of fish juveniles, use of advance technology by the fishers 
all impact the design and success of these policies. 
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2.2 Literature Review 
 Given the extent to which fishery context drives policy implementation and 
performance, we summarize different fishery case studies to obtain a better idea about 
different aspects of fishery management. This section gives extended information 
about case studies related to the current biological threats to fishery resources and 
economical threats to fishing communities. Further, we discuss prevailing 
management systems and its loop holes considering developing nations. Moreover, 
we discuss management systems of fishery resources in developed nations and their 
effectiveness in different organizational settings.  
 
2.2.1 Case studies on biological and economical issues related to fishery  
 Garcia and Newton (1995) summarized different aspects of fisheries such as, 
fish production, state of the exploitation of fishery resources and the impact on fishing 
communities due to resource depletion in the globe. The data showed 32 percent of 
the stocks are under-exploited and 69 percent are exploited/beyond the level 
correspond to MSY. The main reasons for the exploitation of the fishery resource are; 
no selectivity in gear, by-catch (harvest untargeted species), discards (dead and 
including unknown large quantities of juveniles), adverse fishing techniques 
(trawling, dynamite fishing) etc. (Garcia and Newton, 1995; Alverson et al., 1994). 
 Alverson et al. (1994) emphasized the issue of fish discards which is one of 
the critical factors in the fisheries nowadays. He estimated the discards by the world’s 
marine fisheries amount to about 27 million tons with the global landings of 82.5 
million tons. This indicates that about 25 percent of the fish caught is discarded. 
Increasing degradation of the marine environment is another critical issue of concern. 
Use of huge nets and trawling cause damage to the coastal region. Coastal region 
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facilitates critical habitats, nurseries, feeding and spawning areas. The consequences 
of the exploitation of coastal region mainly affects the small-scale fishers since they 
harvest near the coast. For example, Garcia and Newton (1995) indicated such 
decrease in production in coastal zone in the Black Sea region. The fishery resources 
of this area, “which produced about a million tons of landings in the late 1980s, have 
collapsed, through overfishing, to 100-200 tons in 1991”. The consequence of this 
fishery collapse was reflected by the majority of the jobs that left the fishery industry 
leading to hundreds of millions of dollars loss to the economy.  
 Das et al. (2010) studied sustainability of marine fishing based on a case study 
of West Bengal. Other than the factors highlighted by Garcia and Newton (1995) and 
Alverson et al. (1994), they paid more attention to the overfishing issue since fishery 
is an open access resource and any one can harvest to their own interests. With the 
increasing demand for fish, some governments encourage fishing industries in order 
to support the production. West Bengal is also a major contributor to the fisheries 
industry. Thus, the government facilitates this increasing demand for fish by investing 
more on production. Some investments involve “introduction of mechanized fishing 
vessels, improvement of fishing implements, establishment of infrastructure facilities 
for preservation, processing, storage and transportation of fish, fishery products and 
landing and berthing of vessels”. Facilitation of production leads to depletion of fish 
stock for the future. Das et al. (2010) highlights the consequences of overfishing for 
the West Bengal fishery that might face in the future by presenting some cases which 
have been already facing issues due to over fishing, i.e. “In Northwest Atlantic, 
herring catches have declined by 70 percent, Atlantic redfish declined by 50 percent 
and Atlantic mackerel by 90 percent during the period 1970-1989”. Das et al. (2010) 
showed increased mechanization of fishing vessels leading to exploitation of the 
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coastal regions of West Bengal. Researchers suggest proper management can, by 
controlling fishing effort, help marine fisheries to be sustained in the long run. Yet, 
uplifting the living standards of fishing communities while safeguarding the fishery 
resource is a challenging issue. 
 
2.2.2 Evaluating fishery management practices in developing nations 
 Evans et al. (2011) conducted a meta-analysis regarding the impact of fisheries 
co-management interventions across developing nations using 29 case studies. He 
considered co-management mechanisms such as; “power sharing, institution building, 
enhanced trust and social capital, problem solving and knowledge-sharing and social 
learning”. This study used five main indicators to assess the outcome of co-
management practices in selected study sites. These were “access to resources, 
resource well-being, fishery yield, household well-being, and household income”. 
 Results showed existing co-management practices leads to a decline in access 
to the resource (not over using) and that leads to an increasing fishery yield over time. 
The resource well being indicators and yield indicators suggested, in combination, co-
management interventions leads to improve resource status. The household well-being 
and income indicators also showed a higher frequency of significant positive trends 
(62 and 25 percent respectively). However, researchers argued this income increases 
can be a result of non-fisheries resources, for instance, microcredit ventures or from 
alternative jobs in urban areas. Study showed an increasing participation for the co-
management practices by the community. “None of the case-studies reported a 
negative trend for participation, with only 5 percent of the total indicator frequency 
indicating no change”. Rule compliance is the only process indicator for which some 
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case-studies found significant negative trends (6 percent). Overall, the study 
concluded the co-management is a better approach to manage small-scale fisheries. 
 Deepananda et al. (2016) studied how knowledge sharing works as a tool to 
manage fishery resources in developing nations based on a case study of Southern Sri 
Lanka. They found traditional fishers (stilt fishing is the traditional fishing method in 
southern coast of Sri Lanka) hold detailed knowledge on biological and physical 
indicators of fishery, such as; knowledge about weather, fishing season, feeding and 
migratory behavior of target fishes. Most small-scale fisheries throughout the world 
are based primarily on fisher knowledge, “which is essentially experiential knowledge 
consisting of a replicable, verbally transmitted set of skills”. They showed traditional 
fishers are more successful in fishing than non-traditional fishers since traditional stilt 
fishers signal and provide inexpensive information to other fishers in their 
community. They showed knowledge sharing can use as an expertise tool to produce 
better management outcomes. 
 Allison and Ellis (2001) also explored conventional fishery management 
approaches in developing nations. They indicated that community based management 
approach does not show a significant improvement in resource well being and the 
well being of livelihoods since the failures of community formation. Community can 
be a “spatial unit, a social structure or a shared set of norms”. Spatial view of 
community is, defining “Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries” (TURFS). TURFS are 
problematic where the fish species are highly mobile (i.e. coastal small-pelagic fish). 
According to the TURFS fishers are not allowed to go out of their fishing regions. 
Thus, mobility of fish makes fishers to lose their profits. In the concept of “social 
structure” in the community based management predicted being in the same social 
state reduces conflicts in interactions and promotes coordination. However, rights 
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depend on social status also critical in some cases. For instance, research in fishing 
villages on Lake Malawi showed that, “ethnicity is often a critical issue in fishing 
villages, with those involved in fishing frequently being migrants from other areas, 
while long-term residents may be more interested in farming than fishing”. The 
concept of “social norms” in community based management is also critical due to the 
dynamic nature of norms. Based on the problems with community formation and 
assigning rights, Allison and Ellis (2001) suggested encouraging reciprocal access to 
resources (this allows mobility and can also be beneficial to stock conservation since 
it enables fishers to move away from locally depleted resources), facilitate alternative 
jobs, financial support mechanisms (i.e. loans) are important to manage fishery 
communities and the fishery resources in developing nations. 
 According to the FAO (accessed 2017) limitations of community based 
management arise due to difficulties in dealing with spill-over effects. One such 
spillover effect is some fishers do not like to corporate with other fishers even though 
the aggregate actions by fishers benefits the whole society. Fishers act independently 
in order to maximize their own profits. The reason might be fishers have lack of 
community ties with other fishers to believe that all the fishers will cooperate to 
increase aggregate benefits. Fishers’ lack of commitment to justice and fairness is 
another issue to not cooperate to manage fishery resource for the future. Also fishing 
community might not be consisted with homogeneous fishers. For instance, in Digha 
fishery there are large scale trawler boat fishers and small scale traditional fishers. 
Thus, these two groups have different interests (target different species and different 
markets) associated with their capability of engage in fishing (information gathered 
through site visits to Digha). This heterogeneity contributes to fishers acting 
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independently to maximize their profits since each fishing group has different 
operational costs and skills.  
 Thomson and Gray (2009) studied how the transition of community 
management to co-management changes the fisheries governance in the Cherai Poyil 
fishery in the Cochin Estuary, Kerala, India. Study showed the co-management where 
the power is shared among the government and the local community is a better way to 
manage fishery industry. After the state government nationalized the Cherai Poyil 
fishery as a national state property, fishers complained government puts strict 
restrictions on use of the fishing gears. Also public auctioning of fishery rights 
benefited private contractors leaving the local communities out of the business. Later 
even the government handed over the management of the fishing rights to the local 
community fisher’s organizations; management was not successful due to lack of 
financial resources and personnel. Then the co-management was introduced. 
Later the debate of commercial fishery (exports, large-scale processing) 
management emerged from whether well-defined rights are necessary for the 
sustainability of fishery resources (Kroetz et al., 2016). However, the most 
assessments on well-defined rights based management of fishery resources were 
based on developed countries (Kroetz et al., 2016). With the general demand for 
rights based fisheries as the solution to fisheries problems in many developing 
countries, researchers started to assess the feasibility of implementing rights based 
fishery management systems in developing nations (Hersoug, 2011). Based on the 
significant positive outcomes of well-defined fishery management systems in 
developed countries, Hersoug (2011) brought up the claim, “rights based fisheries is 
the solution, but should focus on the challenges of allocating fishing rights in 
developing countries”. One challenge was limiting access (through rights-based 
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approaches) might harm the poorest, the ones most dependent on the open access 
resources. Also limited infrastructure-including for monitoring and enforcement of 
compliance is a critical issue. The designing and development of quota markets is also 
challenging in developing countries due to the lack of information on landings, i.e. in 
developed countries reporting of landings are quite efficient. In Alaska there is a 
fishing reporting regulation called “ADF&G (Alaska Department of Fish and Game) 
fish ticket” under which all the fishers have to fill a form manually or electronically 
regarding their landings and submit to the nearest ADF&G office before selling to 
consumers. This system helps to accurately keep the records on landings (Alaska 
Department of Fish and Game, accessed 2017). However, there is a little assessment 
of economic analysis of performance of rights based fishery management systems in 
developing countries (Kroetz et al., 2016).  
To do an economic analysis of a rights based fishery management system in 
the context of developing nations, it is important to understand the criteria to measure 
the performance of a rights based fishery management system. From literature on 
developed country case studies it is evident that the quota design details (allocation 
criteria) and the context (status quo, market structure, industry participants) of the 
fishery setting are important factors to analyze the economic impact of a policy. In the 
next section we highlight several case studies on economic analysis of rights based 
fishery management systems in developed countries. 
 
2.2.3 Evaluating fishery management practices in developed nations 
 Researchers have studied economic impacts of rights based fishery 
management policies for various fisheries. Arnason (1993) studied the impact of TAC 
policy in Herring fishery in Iceland. He observed even though the TAC reduces the 
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total fish catch, some fishers underutilize the fishing fleets due to competition post-
TAC implementation. The competition occurs due to the cap on harvest. Thus, the 
efficient fishers (more experienced and high tech fishers) fill their boats before the 
inefficient fishers, leaving inefficient fishers to underutilize their full vessel capacity. 
That increase competition put greater pressure on fishers than under the open-access 
fisheries since, under open-access fisheries, fishers are able to harvest without any 
limit on catch. The race for catch is described as "Derby" or "Olympic"-fisheries 
(FAO, accessed 2017). This race to harvest increases harvesting costs of fishers and 
decreases the quality of catch (aesthetic appearance and freshness or degree of 
spoilage-FAO, accessed 2017). 
 Later Arnason (1993) examined the social and economic impact of ITQs in 
different fisheries in different times using empirical data of Icelandic fisheries. The 
ITQ system was designed mainly for a certain gear, area and fish size. Study showed 
various economic benefits of an ITQ. The elimination of competition for the fish 
stock by ITQs (because fishers hold individual property rights) led to minimum 
efforts by fishers and reduced harvesting costs. Revenues were increased by 
improving the quality of catch. In a study carried out in Demersal fisheries it was 
estimated the increase in revenues due to decrease in efforts and increase in quality 
was 8.5 percent of the value of Dermasal fisheries in 1984. Also the economic rents 
were calculated using the market for quota. Results showed in the first year of vessel 
quota system 11 percent of outstanding quotas were exchanged. Over all the study 
showed introduction of the ITQ system appears to have a dramatic increase in 
efficiency of fishers.  
 Dewees (1998) studied the economic impact of ITQs in New Zealand 
fisheries. New Zealand implemented ITQs for most of its commercial fishers. The 
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allocations were based on catch histories and adjusted to meet the TAC levels for 
different species. A low initial resource rental was charged. The interviewed sample 
consisted of majority of small-scale quota holders and few vertically integrated 
companies. These companies stated that “their firms’ relatively secure fish supplies 
resulting from the ITQ system, enabled them to do long term planning and value-
added product development”. Small-scale quota owners had mix feelings towards 
ITQs since the target species by them has undergone a significant decline by the TAC. 
Study concluded pre-ITQ industry structure and the design details of each ITQ system 
strongly influence the outcomes for industry participants. 
 Most of the ITQ research was focusing on the gains for the fishers due to 
elimination of a Derby-style fishery and efficiency gains by trading quota. Little 
attention has been paid to the potential gains from increase in fish prices (known as 
ex-vessel prices) due to the less supply of fish. Herrmann (1996) showed that there is 
a significant increase in ex-vessel prices with the introduction of ITQs. This is one of 
the first studies which empirically examined the ex-vessel price effects and the 
resulting revenue effects of an ITQ system.  
 Later studies focused on implications for the management policies by 
incorporating the processing sector (purchasers of fish). Clark and Munro (2017) 
studied an open access fishery model consisting of a competitive harvesting sector 
and a monopsonistic processing sector. They showed given a competitive harvesting 
sector, monopsonists manage the fishery in a socially optimal manner. Also Matulich 
et al. (1995) showed when there is a monopoly harvesting sector and a monopsony 
processing sector, bargaining between parties will help to joint profit maximization.  
 Studies were extended to analyze the economic impacts on processors when 
the fishery management policy changes from open access to derby fisheries and to 
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IQs (Steven et al., 2005). There is an argument on equity concerns for harvesting and 
the processing sector with the implementation of a TAC or IQ system. TAC will put a 
cap on total fish catch. Decrease in supply of fish result in increase of ex-vessel 
prices. With the less supply of fish, processors invest on preserving techniques to 
make fish available in the rest of the year. Processing preserved fish products involves 
higher fixed costs relative to fresh fish. Higher ex-vessel prices and processing costs 
increase the total cost to the processors and result some processors exiting the 
industry. Steven et al. (2005) also showed how the transition of a policy from derby 
style (TAC) to IQs impact processors. The reduction of race for catch by IQs spread 
out landings over a longer period of time and allows better capacity utilization at 
existing processing facilities. Thus, with IQs, reduction in ex-vessel prices will not let 
processors exit the market since processors efficiently utilize the capacity. Thus, 
implementation of IQs will not concentrate the processing sector.  
 Considering the studies in the literature it is evident that understanding the 
current issues in the industry (biological threat, economics of fishing community), 
status quo management, industry organization, and the design of the quota are 
important factors to analyze the impact of a policy for industry participants. Other 
than the context, a common limitation with TAC and ITQs is difficulty in monitoring 
and enforcement. Monitoring and enforcement of a quota system is difficult as it 
involves administration work and involves responsible personnel (FAO, 2017). This is 
more challenging when it comes to monitoring whether individual fishers are 
adhering to their quotas than when evaluating if an entire fishery is adhering to the 
TAC. 
 Another limitation is inappropriate institutional arrangements. Not having a 
proper network of management institutions/organizations can lead to breakdown of 
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communication and cooperation between responsible parties (FAO, 2017). Countries 
like Australia, Canada and New Zealand have showed moving towards a co-
management system reflects efficient management of fishery resources (FAO, 2017). 
Such limitations are critical in developing country settings other than the context 
specific limitations mentioned by Hersoug (2011). In the following chapter we are 
going to study the Digha Fishery context extensively to support the economic analysis 
of a well-defined rights based fishery management system in place. 
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CHAPTER 3: DIGHA FISHERY 
3.1 Introduction 
3.1.1 Prevailing fishery management system in India 
 The fisheries in maritime states (within the territorial limits of 12 miles) and 
inland waters of India are managed under the “Marine Fishing Regulation Act 
(MFRA)”. These regulations were formulated by the Ministry Of Agriculture, 
Government of India, in 1979 (The Fisheries Law Centre, accessed 2017). Some of 
the fishery management regulations under the MFRA are, “prohibition on certain 
fishing gear, regulation on mesh size, establishment of closed seasons and areas, 
demarcation of zones for no trawling (use of huge nets by large scale commercial 
fishers), turtle excluder devices and designation of no fishing areas”. Additionally, 
“appointing responsible officials, issuing licenses upon meeting several standards, 
registration of fishing vessels and penalties and fines in cases of non-compliance” are 
some of the specific regulatory mechanisms under the MFRA (The Fisheries Law 
Centre, accessed 2017). However, even though there is an established regulatory 
framework, implementation of these laws are challenging due to the lack of 
infrastructure and political pressures (Datta, 2014).  
 
3.1.2 Prevailing fishery management system in West Bengal 
 According to the publication Bay of Bengal Program for Fisheries 
Development (1990), fishery in West Bengal is managed by several institutions. 
These institutions help in improving living standards of fishing communities as well 
as enabling them to comply with fishery legislations. These institutions and their 
functions are as below (Table 3.1). 
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Table 3.1: Fishery Management Institutions in West Bengal and Their Functions 
Institution Functions 
 
1. Marine Products Export 
Development Authority 
 
 
This organization facilitates the exports in 
collaboration with the state government, by giving 
subsidies, training and extension services to shrimp 
farmers. 
 
2. West Bengal State 
Fisheries Development 
Corporation 
 
This organization was initially set up for the 
development of fresh water fish farming. Currently, 
it also facilitates charter of shrimp trawlers to 
private companies. 
 
3. West Bengal Fisheries 
Corporation 
 
This organization facilitates production of fish 
seeds, trading fish, fish landing and also provides 
fishers with infrastructure facilities such as fishing 
nets, safety equipment etc. 
 
4. Brackish Water Fish 
Farmers Development 
Agency 
 
This agency is involved in arranging financial 
support for the small scale fishers for their house 
hold needs. In addition this agency offers training 
and extension facilities to disseminate information 
about modern technology among fishers. 
 
5. Fishermen’s Cooperative 
Societies (FCS) 
FCS are three tier system comprised of fishers 
(primary), district level officials (central) and state 
level officials (apex). Fishers produce fish, central 
bodies facilitate with inputs and state bodies 
manage FCS under them. State bodies manage 
fisheries though different marine fisheries projects 
and also engage in conducting leadership 
development training programs, setting up of ice 
plants by the central societies and construction of 
community halts. 
 
6. National Cooperative 
Development Corporation 
(NCDC) 
 
This organization assists FCS in several ways: share 
capital assistance for marketing; supply transport 
vehicles; development and establishment of fish 
farms and seed farms/hatcheries; establishment of 
processing units; procurement of motorized boats, 
fishing nets; establishment of fish net-making units; 
facilitate storage of fish; and establishment of retail 
fish stalls with the necessary 
equipment/installations. 
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These institutions are primarily based on improving the socio economic conditions of 
fishing communities which would increase fish production. Datta (2014) indicates 
that many states such as West Bengal have no fishery legislation for the conservation 
of the fishery resources partly due to the lack of availability of resources. Moreover, 
over harvest has contributed to the depletion of fishing stock, which poses threats to 
the future of Bengal’s marine fishery. Given this situation, the government has 
focused on introducing policies to manage harvest rates and fish stock, and generate 
livelihood opportunities as well as safeguard the marine ecosystem (Bay of Bengal 
Program for Fisheries Development, 1990). For example, aquaculture plants have 
been introduced to serve the fish demand and rural employment and income has been 
channeled through the “Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Act” (MGNREGA). 
 
3.2 Digha Fishery 
3.2.1 Study site 
 The Digha-Shankarpur region is located in East Midnapore district in the 
Eastern Indian state of West Bengal 115 miles south of Kolkata, the state capital. The 
fishery, is one of the major fisheries of the state and supplies fish to both Indian and 
foreign markets. According to the 2011 Census, out of the 46,532 individuals living in 
the area, more than 20,000 individuals earned their livelihood from this fishery 
(Mandal et al., 2013). Yet, despite the importance of this industry to the local 
economy, the region is among the poorest in the country. Moreover, the fishery is 
vulnerable to natural and anthropogenic stressors such as (i) cyclones (ii) water 
pollution (iii) overfishing and (iv) competition from neighboring domestic (in Odisha) 
and international fisheries (in Bangladesh). Fishing goes on for 10 months each year. 
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Figure 3.1: Map of West Bengal, India with Location of Digha Circled 
 
The fishery is closed every year from mid-April to end June in an effort to let the fish 
stocks regenerate. All fishing activities undertaken by Bengal fishers take place within 
200 nautical miles from the coast. 
 
3.2.2 Market channel 
 There are three types of fishers in this industry depending upon their access to 
technology which permits them to operate within specific distances from the 
shoreline. Row-boat fishers are informally organized and operate within 5 to 7 
nautical miles (nm) from the shore with manually operated boats. Motor-boat fishers 
operate further out at a distance of 5 nm from the shore up to the limits of the 
30 
 
territorial sea (12 nm). Beyond this distance and within 200 nm of India’s exclusive 
economic zone, trawler boats operate.  
 Row boat fishers and motor boat fishers engage in subsistence fishing, and 
partly sell their catch on the local market (through middlemen) and partly use the 
catch for personal consumption. The species they catch typically fetch a lower price 
per pound than those caught by fishing trawlers in the deep sea (which are mostly sold 
in the larger Kolkata market-through middlemen). Generally the reason for harvesting 
low valued species also implies the use of low tech “artisanal” fishing techniques 
(traditional, non-mechanized). Having poor technology limits the ability of the small-
scale fishers to go deep sea fishing. Subsistence fishing is carried out by people who 
are among the poorest in the fishing community and are unwilling to take on the risk 
associated with deep sea fishing. Subsistence fishers usually go on morning fishing 
trips and they get paid for fish based on the demand for fish at a certain point in time. 
Usually, middlemen offer a higher price to fishers who get back earlier in the 
morning. Fishers who return later in the morning often have to settle for a lower price 
since middlemen’s fish demand is highest in the early part of the day. It is better to 
sell the fish at a lower price than discard the catch since subsistence fishers do not 
have storage facilities. Besides the time of the day, fishing trips that yield a poor catch 
also generates low revenue fishers. Sometimes, subsistence fishers go back on an 
afternoon fishing trip particularly when the morning trip failed to generate sufficient 
revenue for the day. On the basis of person interviews with fishers it is evident that 
the daily earnings of fishers are sometimes less than their harvesting costs per day due 
to low prices, more effort (due to more fishing trips and longer hours in the sea), and 
less fish catch.  
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 Trawlers harvest commercially valuable deep sea species. Trawler boats 
typically go for fishing for 8-10 days although in some cases the trips can extend up to 
15 days depending on provisions available on the trawler for fishers’ sustenance and 
catch storage. Information obtained on the basis of personal communications with the 
local Digha fishers during the primary data collection indicated that, there are fewer 
trawler fishers than subsistence fishers in the Digha-Shankarpur area. Trawlers who 
engaged in long-voyage fishing carry ice in insulated cooler boxes installed on board. 
So they have storage facility to keep fish fresh till they get back to shore and can take 
the catch to the trading sites at specific times (Bay of Bengal Program for Fisheries 
Development, 1990). Regardless of type, all fishers deliver the catch to landing 
centers located near the beach by bicycles or carts. Digha and Jaldhaare the main 
landing centers. There are middlemen who come to these two landing centers daily to 
buy the daily harvest from the fishers, and middlemen sell fish in the local or Kolkata 
market. Figure 3.2 shows the links between fishers and middlemen and the markets 
where fishers and middlemen operate. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Market Channel of Digha 
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3.2.3 Primary data collection 
 A structured questionnaire was developed utilizing the information gathered 
from interviews with fishers and researchers in West Bengal, on the basis of site visits 
in 2015. Discussions with personnel from the West Bengal State Fisheries Department 
were useful to identify the development and environmental issues relevant to the 
Digha-Shankarpur fishery. Data was collected between January 3rd and 16th 2016. In 
addition to surveys, personal interviews were conducted as well. A team of 10 
surveyors visited fishing docks and fishers’ huts in 15 fishing hamlets. A total of 291 
fishers were interviewed. Information related to the socio economic background of the 
fishers, nature of their fishing fleet, catch and earnings, effort choices, level of 
concern for environment etc. was collected. 
 
3.2.4 Data analysis 
Descriptive statistics of the sample: 
Demographic characters: 
 Our sample focused on subsistence fishers. Table 3.2 provides a summary of 
the demographic characters of the respondents. The average size of a Digha fisher 
household is 5 and 97 percent of the fishers are married. 72 percent of the households 
have only one earner in the family which further exacerbates the impoverished state 
of these communities given the poverty in the region as a whole. Average age of a 
fisher is 42 years and on average they have been engaged in fishing for 21 of these 
years. More than half of the sample of fishers have completed primary level education 
and continued to secondary level education. But, only 3 percent of fishers have 
completed secondary school. The Spearman rank correlation coefficient of fishers’ 
age and years of education shows there is a negative correlation (-0.202).  
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Thus, younger fishers in the data set are more educated which indicates a generational 
increase in the emphasis placed on formal education in the community. Additionally, 
younger fishers are more likely to engage in a second job to supplement income from 
fishing and often times leave the fishing industry for alternative jobs (in Digha or 
other parts of the state) given their educational levels. 
 Digha fishers were interviewed regarding the likelihood of their children 
engaging in fishing in the future. Figure 3.3 shows 80 percent of the fishermen’s 
children do not engage in fishing. Figure 3.4 indicates that of the families which had 
 
Table 3.2: Demographic Characters 
 
Variable 
 
Description 
 
% of Respondents 
Age of the fisher (years) 
 
10-29 
30-49 
50-69 
≥70 
 
12 
61 
26 
1 
Years schooling 
 
0 (Illiterate)  
 
7 
1-4 (Below primary school 
level) 
25 
5-11 (Completed primary 
school but not secondary 
school) 
68 
12 (Completed secondary 
school) 
3 
Marital status 
 
Married 
 
97 
Single 3 
No. of family members 
 
<5 
 
58 
5-10 41 
>10 1 
 
No. of earners in the family 
 
 
 
 
1 72 
2 21 
3 4 
4 1 
5 1 
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sons, the likelihood of sons fishing in the future is extremely unlikely. 61 percent of 
the respondents revealed their sons are extremely unlikely to engage in fishing in the 
future and are willing to leave the industry because of no economic prospect and 
because of the obvious dangers of the occupation. Thus, the subsistence fishery may 
dwindle as discouraged workers leave the industry for alternative jobs that pay more. 
Such migration to other sectors has consequence for long term sustainability of the 
subsistence fishery in the area.  
Fishing fleet: 
 The sample of fishers consisted with 57 percent of manual row boat fishers 
and 43 percent of motor boat fishers. These boats can be both jointly or individually 
owned. Of the interviewed fishers 29 percent were boat owners, 51 percent were not 
boat owners and 20 percent were joint owners. Generally, fishing crew consists of 
family members, with the owner, often the head of the joint family who in many cases 
is the fishermen with the most fishing experience. Though most crew members are 
hired on a daily wage basis, joint-owners are entitled to a share which means they 
divide total profits equally among the joint-owners (Marine Small-Scale Fisheries of 
West Bengal, 1990).  
  
Figure 3.3: Number of Children Engage 
in Fishing 
Figure 3.4: Likelihood of Fishing in the 
Future 
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Harvest: 
 According to a publication by the Bay of Bengal Program for Fisheries 
Development (1990), major fish species harvested by trawlers, row boat and motor 
boat fishers in West Bengal are shown in Appendix A. The data indicates that 
between 1980 and 1984 total catch has increased rapidly from 6082 tons to 39640 
tons. Trawlers in Digha catch mostly shrimp and other commercially high valued fish 
species. Digha subsistence fisher group harvests commercially low valued fish species 
such as Hilsa, Shad etc.  
Income: 
 The mean weekly income of row boat fishers and motor boat fishers in Digha 
are Rs. 1279 ($20) and Rs. 2220 ($34) respectively.1 Figure 3.5 shows the weekly 
income distribution of the subsistence fishers and it depicts fishers in the area are 
extremely poor as a whole. Also the respondents said that their daily income 
fluctuates over time which implies the instability of income and the daily effort 
choices of fishing families in Digha. According to the World Bank (accessed on 
February 20, 2017) Gross National Income per capita of India in 2015 is 1600 US 
dollars (Rs. 103,360) which implies the weekly earnings of an average Indian is 
Rs.1988. This shows compared to an average person, row boat fisher have low weekly 
income level and the fisher’s income level is not stable.  
 
                                                        
1 The exchange rate of Indian Rupees to US Dollars as at 07/10/2017 is, 1 Dollar=64.60 
Indian Rupees.  
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Figure 3.5 : Weekly Earnings of Fishers 
 
Labor supply/effort choices: 
One of the key goals of this study is to understand the determinants of fishers’ 
daily effort choice. Camerer et al. (1997) found negative labor supply elasticities for 
taxi drivers in New York City, suggesting target-earning behavior whereby when the 
daily earnings target is reached, taxi drivers will end their work shift, irrespective of 
the number of hours worked. However, Farber (2005) found somewhat contradictory 
evidence where their decision to terminate work on any day depends on cumulative 
hours worked, and not on cumulative earnings. Gine et al. (2016) studied labor supply 
of South Indian fishers and showed daily labor participation depends on expected 
earnings but also on recent accumulated earnings. Given this contradictory evidence 
and following Gine et al. (2016), we were interested in this issue since open sea 
fishing like driving a taxi is an activity that poses risks to the individual (in terms of 
life and health) and does not always generate a high revenue. Figure 3.6 indicates that 
most of the fishers do not operate with harvest and earnings targets.  
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Figure 3.6: Presence or Absence of Earning/Harvest Targets by Boat Type 
 
For the motor boat group, we find some evidence of fishers setting earnings target for 
themselves especially among boat owners. There could be multiple reasons for not 
having earning/harvest targets. First, the high variability in earnings with the prospect 
of not making any money on a regular basis might contribute to lack of target-oriented 
earnings behavior. Moreover, fishers have high levels of risk aversion and are not 
willing to take opportunities to earn more by switching to alternative jobs or joining 
with trawlers. 67 percent of the fishers stated that they are extremely unlikely to join 
large scale fishing where they can earn a guaranteed daily wage (Figure 3.7). For 
example, a respondent who hadn’t had any earning over the past 22 days (owing to a 
temporary jelly fish infestation that destroys nets) and whose family was surviving on 
informal borrowing from friends and relatives said he wouldn’t work on a trawler 
even temporarily if given an opportunity. Thus, overall unpredictability of the fishery 
and natural ecosystem prevents the fishers from having fishing targets which they 
could have if they are guaranteed some positive levels of income per trip.  
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Finally outside of the fishery lack of alternative job opportunities is likely to reduce 
their tendencies to consider harvest and earning targets (Figure 3.8). 
Alternative Jobs: 
 All respondents attributed the low per capita earnings in the fishery to 
depletion of fish stock owing to unregulated overfishing by trawlers, fish price 
fluctuations at landing docks and weather hazards. In fact, 59 percent of all 
respondents have a second job in Digha and nearby towns which underscores the 
respondents’ propensity to avoid the physical exertion and risk associated with fishing 
(both on trawlers and in the subsistence setting). This issue is important as it suggests 
that low stocks and lack of regeneration can lead to the collapse of the subsistence 
fishery in the future if most of the fishers find it is no longer profitable to stay in the 
industry. 
 We also asked fishers who do not have a second job, the reasons for this 
decision. 27 percent of the respondents ranked “there are lack of opportunities to earn 
additional income” as the most important reason to not engage in a second job. This is 
not surprising given the overall poverty of the area. 33 percent said “fishing makes 
them too tired to engage in other activities for additional income” as the most 
  
Figure 3.7: Likelihood of Joining Large 
Scale Fishing With Trawlers 
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important reason. Only 5 percent of the respondents said “fishing is their way of life – 
they don’t want to do any other job” is the most important reason for not engaging in 
second jobs. None of the respondents said “they are happy with their earnings from 
fishing and don’t need another job” and “they don’t have additional skills needed to 
do any other job” as important reasons for not having second jobs. The results imply 
that improvement of subsistence fishers’ economic conditions will require a multi-
pronged strategy that targets sustainable fishing behavior and creation of jobs within 
the local economy.  
Saving decisions: 
 Majority of the Digha fishers (80.73 percent) save less than Rs. 500 per week 
(average savings is Rs. 298). Compared to the average weekly earnings (Rs. 1282) of 
fishers, their weekly savings are nearly 23 percent of the average weekly earnings. 
The Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation (accessed in 2017) projected 
the average Indian household savings rate in 2016-2017 is 26.8 percent. Assuming the 
average weekly savings rate of a fisher remains the same across weeks; fisher’s 
savings rate is closer enough to the savings rate of an average Indian household. 94 
percent of the respondents save for self and/or other family members; 75 percent said 
they save for days without work (i.e. due to bad weather); 70 percent said for their 
own future, 68 percent said they save for personal and family expenses during the 
months they do not fish, 50 percent said for their sons’ education and 40 percent said 
for their daughters’ education. 28 and 34 percent of the respondents stated they save 
for children’s wedding and for home repairs respectively. None of the respondents 
stated that they do not have interest in saving, which implies even though the fishers’ 
income is low they save to financially secure their future.  
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Competition in fishing: 
 The survey indicates that subsistence fishers face competition from their peers 
and from trawlers. Figure 3.9 shows fishers’ perceptions regarding the type of 
competition they face from other fishers in different fishing villages on the survey 
site. On the basis of the data set at least 30 percent of the surveyed fishers indicated 
that they experience increased competition from the trawler boats and 33 percent of 
the respondents said they face competition from other subsistence fishers. Fishers also 
indicated that the competition with other subsistence fishers is influenced by the 
harvesting behavior of trawlers. Respondents stated that they are aware that the large 
deep sea trawlers are able to increase their landings both in terms of quantity and 
variety of species harvested given the technology they have at their disposal. Some 
species caught in the nets of the trawlers are untargeted by trawlers and generate no 
economic value for them. In fisheries literature, these untargeted species that are 
caught in the nets are termed as by-catch. 
 
Figure 3.9: Competition in Each Fishing Village 
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Often these species are dumped in the ocean thereby resulting in a loss of fish stock. 
However, these by-catch species are valuable to the subsistence fishers close to the 
shore who typically would catch these species when they moved closer to the shore. 
Depletion of target fish stock of the subsistence fishers makes them come to the shore 
with empty vessels. The survey data showed 63 percent of the respondents take 
fishing trips in all seven days of a week and average time spent on the sea per fishing 
trip is 8 hours. This over commitment to resources leads to overcapitalization of the 
fishery and generates contemporaneous external cost. More fishing efforts by 
subsistence fishers implies, low stocks have resulted in more intensive fishing which 
further contributes to depressing available stocks. Over usage of fishery resource 
occurs as a result of unrestricted/open access entry to the fishery industry and due to 
not having well-defined property rights. Thus, low stocks affect both livelihoods and 
the safety of the fishing community since it pushes fishers to take more risks, 
regardless of fishers’ preferences to do so. The situation is exacerbated because 
fishers might find that fish caught in one trip is not sufficient to recover the total 
expenses spent per trip. Hence, they have to go out to sea again.  
 Other than the by-catch problem, fishers claimed trawling causes damage to 
the shore-line where the habitat for target species of the subsistence fishers is. Thus, 
the fish mobility increases and fishers mentioned that, “in the past, they were able to 
get expected harvest close to the shore but, in recent years; fish availability within 5-
12 nm from the beach has significantly declined”. As a result, subsistence fishers now 
have to travel further into the ocean. These fishing pattern changes are problematic 
especially for row boat fishers who have to expend considerable physical energy in 
rowing the boats. Also risk for fishers increase overall in terms of the additional 
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danger faced because their boats are not equipped to handle the dangers of the open 
sea.  
Environmental threat: 
 Another main source of risk faced by the fishers in Digha-Shankarpur fishing 
industry stems from uncertainty of weather patterns, climate change and water 
pollution. 68 percent of the respondents revealed they lose 10-15 fishing days per 
month due to bad weather. According to Figure 3.10, to supplement the loss income, 
fishers increase the days and the time spent on fishing in the days with better weather 
conditions to get a good catch. Some fishers borrow money from others to meet the 
expenses. Also we asked fishers about the precautions they take for bad weather. 
Almost all fishers said they do not take any precautions since they do not have money 
to spend on safety precautions. Thus, they have to engage in risky fishing activities 
and take risks even though it might not be in their best interests to do so. 
 
Figure 3.10: Strategies to Supplement Income Losses from Lost Fishing Days 
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Of the few respondents who take some precautions, these involved getting a sturdier 
boat, taking a wireless GPS tracker when fishing and carrying a life jacket, tube 
and/or water pump with them (to bail out water). Despite the inherent risk of the 
occupation, 55 percent of the fishers do not have life insurance. Of those who do have 
insurance the average insurance premium paid by the fishers was Rs. 1544.  
 Fishers’ concern for climate change and water pollution is very low. 62 
percent of the respondents said they are not at all aware of climate change/water 
pollution. 23 percent of the respondents are slightly concerned, 11 percent are 
moderately concerned and only 4 percent are extremely concerned. One reason for the 
lack of awareness of the climate change/water pollution might be the insufficient 
knowledge of the fishers. Moreover, despite the climate change and fluctuating 
weather patterns being important determinants of fishery health, immediate economic 
concerns may be preventing fishers from dwelling on these long-term threats and 
more on the relatively short-term threats posed by trawlers. However, lack of 
awareness leads to face risk situations in the ocean and ultimately leads to more 
fishing efforts and low income levels. Knowledge sharing, where experienced fishers 
make other fishers aware of the climate and weather conditions, could result in 
awareness about these issues and how fisheries can be managed and made more 
resilient in the future.  
 
3.2.5 Conclusion 
 Considering the previous ecological and biological studies and the economic 
study of the Digha subsistence fishery on the basis of the data collected, it is essential 
to increase effective government regulation and monitoring to secure fishery resource 
and the livelihoods of fishing families in Digha. The economic study highlights, 
44 
 
Digha subsistence fishers facing income losses and that leads to not having prospects 
for future generation to engage in the fishing industry. Thus, there is a possibility of 
collapse of the market of local fishing community.  
 The leading cause for the low income levels is the depletion of target fish 
stock of the subsistence fishers. As identified trawler’s by-catch is the main cause for 
the depletion of fish stock. The competition generated among subsistence fishers due 
to depletion of fish stock and increase in efforts further intensifies the rates of 
depletion and low income among subsistence fishers. Thus, the regulation should 
address the dual problem of depletion of fish stock and as well as the competitive 
pressures of the subsistence fishers which affects the economic conditions of the 
fishing families, health of the fishery resource and the fishery industry as a whole.  
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CHAPTER 4: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF A RIGHTS BASED FISHERY 
MANAGEMENT POLICY IN A HETEROGENEOUS FISHERY SETTING 
4.1 Introduction 
 This chapter identifies the policy measures under which the dual problem of 
stock depletion and unsustainable competitive pressures on the subsistence fishers in 
Digha can be tackled. The issues of depletion of fish stock and the competitive 
pressures among fishers arise due to not having an effective monitoring process of 
existing regulations. Moreover, current amount of regulation is inadequate as well. 
According to the information gathered from officials in West Bengal Fisheries 
Department, fishing in the Digha goes on for 10 months per year. The officials stated 
the existing seasonal closure policy may not be sufficient to regenerate the fish stock 
given the increased fishing effort during the fishing season. Hence, additional policy 
intervention is required to sustainably manage the resource. Other than the 
management failures of existing systems, not having well-defined property rights 
determining fishers’ access to the resource is a major reason for the depletion of the 
fish stock and the competition. To this end we focus on the relevance of a well-
defined rights based policy in Digha to sustainably manage the fishery resource and 
the livelihoods of subsistence fishers. In order to do so, we focus on both subsistence 
fishers, trawler boat fishers and the middlemen since the behavior and policy targeting 
one industry participants impacts the others.  
 
4.2 Economic Analysis of a Rights Based Fishery Management Policy 
 Figure 4.1 presents the key factors to be considered for the economic analysis 
of any rights based fishery management system. 
 
46 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Criteria for Economic Analysis of a Rights Based Fishery Management 
Policy 
 
The identified criteria for the economic analysis of a rights based fishery management 
system are from an extensive analysis of the case studies which we have described in 
the literature review section. Design of a rights based fishery management policy is 
context specific. A key feature of the Digha fishery is that it is a heterogeneous 
fishery with the co-existence of both subsistence fishers and trawlers. The subsistence 
fishers are affected by the fishing behavior of the trawler fishers although the markets 
for subsistence fishers and the trawlers are segmented since they target different 
species of fish (type of fish caught is a function of the fishing technology these two 
groups have at their disposal). Given this heterogeneous fishery setting and the 
conflicts of interests of fisher groups, we focus on a policy design which can 
individually regulate the two segmented markets to achieve sustainable fishery 
management goals. To this end we consider separate TACs for each fisher group.  
 In the next section we come up with a basic theoretical model for fishers’ 
profit maximization problems and we discuss the welfare impacts for subsistence 
fishers and trawlers under three situations. 
1. In the absence of any policy i.e. the status quo. 
2. With a TAC and discuss how this is (or is it) better relation to the status 
quo. 
(1) 
Identification of the 
issues in the fishery 
(condition of the 
ecosystem and the 
fishers)
(2) 
Status quo:
•Status of prevailing 
management system
•Industry organization                             
(3) 
Design of the 
policy and 
analysis
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3. Introduce TAC with ITQ and discuss how this is better (or not) relative to 
the status quo and only the TAC.  
Further, we briefly explain the impact on middlemen and the final consumers due to 
the TAC and TAC-ITC policy.  
 
4.3 Theoretical Model 
Fishery industry participants: 
 We consider two groups of fishers namely trawlers and subsistence fishers. In 
the Digha fishery setting subsistence fisher group consists with motor boat fishers and 
row boat fishers. But for the modeling purposes we do not consider the heterogeneity 
within the subsistence fishers group. Fishers sell fish to the middlemen. Table 4.1 
summarizes the industry participants and their characteristics. Each fisher engages in 
fishing in a vessel that is large (Trawlers) or small (Subsistence fishers) (types t or s, 
respectively). Trawlers target “T” species and subsistence fishers target “S” species. 
All vessels of a given type are assumed to be identical in terms of the fishing 
technique and the target fish species. Within each group of fishers there are efficient 
fishers who have more fishing experience and hence are aware of the dynamics of 
fishing, and so are able to increase their harvests with less effort.  
 We use similar specifications of average costs and fixed costs of fishers as in 
Keisaku and Shunsuke (2010) which index large scale fishers with low variable costs 
and small scale fishers with high variable costs. The jth fisher’s total cost (ܥ௜௝) is the 
sum of fixed cost and the variable cost.  
ܥ௜௝ = ܶܨܥ௜ + ܸܶܥ௜௝(݁௜௝)                             (1) 
i implies the two groups of fishers t and s. Fixed costs (ܶܨܥ) of the fishers in a one 
group are similar. Fixed costs of trawlers is greater than the fixed costs of subsistence 
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fishers. Total variable cost (ܸܶܥ) differs among all fishers since the effort levels are 
different from one fisher to the other. However, we assume for each effort level, 
average variable cost (ܣܸܥ) is constant for both groups of fishers and average 
variable cost is less for the trawler boat fisher group than the subsistence fisher group. 
 (ܣܸܥ௧ < ܣܸܥ௦). Thus, the simple function for total cost can be written as ܥ௜௝ = ܿ௜ ௜݁௝. 
ܿ௜ is the average variable cost and is different from subsistence fishers to trawlers and 
the efforts (݁௜௝) are different for each fisher in the same group. Trawler fishers are 
efficient than the subsistence fishers.  
 As mentioned previously, use of large nets by trawlers leads to by-catch which 
affects the fish available for subsistence fishers. Following Mukherjee (2015), we 
assume that by-catch is a constant fraction of total harvest by the trawlers. The catch 
coefficient (b) captures this relationship.  
Table 4.1: Industry Participants  
Industry participants Characteristics 
 
Subsistence fishers (s): 
 
 
 
*Harvest species which have low value in 
the commercial markets outside the area. 
Thus, sold in Local markets. 
* Average Variable Cost of harvesting is 
high (AVCs) 
*Total Fixed Cost is low (TFCs) 
 
Trawlers (t): * Harvest species which have high value in 
the commercial markets. Thus, sold in 
Kolkata market. 
* Average Variable Cost of harvesting is 
low (AVCt) (more efficient fishers) 
* Total Fixed Cost is high (TFCt) 
*By-catch coefficient is b 
 
Middlemen: 
 
 
 
*Homogeneous 
*Middlemen buy fish from subsistence 
fishers and/or trawlers and sell in the 
Digha Local market (L) and/or commercial 
market in Kolkata (K). 
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 Middlemen are price setters and fishers are price takers so that at any price, 
fishers operate as competitive firms and can sell as much fish as possible at the 
market price at that time of the day. Note, if we assume, both types of fishers sell to 
middlemen who set the market prices, then these fishers merely respond to the set 
prices by adjusting the output decision. The prices set by the middlemen can depend 
on other factors such as price offered both in the Kolkata and the local Digha market, 
rise in export demand, total available supply, transportation cost, and storage cost. 
 Middlemen sell low value fish in the local market and commercially valued 
fish both in the Kolkata and local markets. But we assume the portion sold in local 
market does not significantly affect the profits of the middlemen since the demand for 
commercially valued fish is low in the local market. Individual Digha middlemen are 
price takers in the local/Kolkata market as there are many outside fish suppliers. 
However, changes in the total supply by the Digha middlemen can affect the price 
they receive in the local/Kolkata market. Considering the industry participants and the 
organization structure, the following section explains the welfare impacts for 
subsistence fishers, trawlers and the middlemen under pre-quota and post-quota 
conditions.  
 
Pre-quota condition: 
Assumptions: 
 Each fisher is a price taker. Price per pound received by subsistence fishers 
is ௦ܲ and price per pound received by trawlers is ௧ܲ.  
 Marginal cost of effort for trawlers and subsistence fishers is constant and 
presented by ܿ௜. 
 Quantity harvested is a function of effort (݁) and available stock (ܣ). 
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Following Mukherjee (2015) and Munro (1982), we assume harvest function for the 
jth trawler fisher of type k is ݍ௧௝ = ߙ௞݁௧௝ܣ௧௝. Similarly the harvest function for the jth 
subsistence fisher of type k is specified as, ݍ௦௝ = ߚ௞݁௦௝ܣ௦௝. Here, ∝௞ and ߚ௞  are the 
catch coefficients for trawler fishers and subsistence fishers respectively (∝௞> ߚ௞). 
Subsistence fishers and trawlers have different catch coefficients since they have 
different technology. Catch coefficient varies among less efficient (k=L) and more 
efficient (k=H) fishers within the same group (L<H). ݁௦௝  is the effort of jth subsistence 
fisher. ௧݁௝  is the effort of jth trawler fisher. ܣ௦௝  is the available stock of “S” species for 
a  jth subsistence fisher and ܣ௧௝ is the available stock of “T” species for a  jth trawler 
fisher. Each fisher targets only one type of species. 
 Availability of the stock of each species type depends on the harvest by the jth 
fisher and the harvest by other fishers in the group who target that type (we do not 
know if the available stock is enough to catch the optimum levels of harvest. Thus, we 
take into account the harvest by other fishers in the group which leads to competition 
to harvest under the lack of target fish stock). As mentioned, for subsistence fishers 
availability of the stock of their target species is also affected by the by-catch by the 
trawlers. The modified stock level function for a subsistence fisher is thus given by, 
ܣ௦ = ܺ − ܾ݉݁௧ − ݊݁௦                                 (2) 
In this expression, the available fish stock of “S” species is inversely related to the 
total effort by the subsistence fishers (݁௦) and the by-catch coefficient (b)*total effort 
by the trawlers (݁௧). ܾ݉݁௧  is the total by-catch by the trawlers. ݊݁௦ is the total harvest 
by subsistence fishers. The modified stock function for a trawler fisher is given by, 
ܣ௧ = ܺ −݉݁௧                                                (3) 
This shows that the available fish stock of “T” species is inversely related to the total 
effort by the trawler fishers (݁௧). ݉݁௧  is the total harvest by trawlers. Subsistence 
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fishers’ effort does not affect the target fish stock of the trawlers. ݉ and ݊ are the rate 
at which the stock is depleting (or the harvest rate) with a unit increase in effort by a 
trawler and a subsistence fisher respectively. 
 In the absence of any regulation; the profit maximization problem for a jth 
trawler fisher (for both types-efficient and inefficient) is: 
Max ߨ௧௝ =  ௧ܲ .∝௞ ݁௧௝ܣ௧௝ − ܶܨܥ௧ − ܿ௧ ௧݁௝                                   (4) 
I replace the stock ܣ௧௝ by ܣ௧௝ = ௧ܺ௝ −݉௧௝ ௧݁௝  
Here ܺ௧௝ is the initial stock less the harvest by all other trawler fishers except the jth 
trawler fisher and ݉௧௝݁௧௝ is the harvest by jth trawler fisher. Fishers maximize their 
profits by choosing the optimum effort levels represented by, 
Max ߨ௧௝ =  ௧ܲ .∝௞ ݁௧௝(ܺ௧௝ −݉௧௝݁௧௝) − ܶܨܥ௧ − ܿ௧ ௧݁௝ 
ߨ௧௝ = ௧ܲ ∝௞ ݁௧௝ ௧ܺ௝ − ௧ܲ ∝௞ ݉௧௝ ௧݁௝ଶ − ܶܨܥ௧ − ܿ௧ ௧݁௝  
∆గ೟ೕ
∆௘೟ೕ
= ௧ܲ ∝௞ ௧ܺ௝ − 2 ௧ܲ ∝௞ ݉௧௝݁௧௝ − ܿ௧=0 
݁∗௧௝ = ௑೟ೕି ೎೟ು೟ഀೖଶ௠೟ೕ                                                (4a) 
I plug the ݁∗௧௝ to the harvest function and it gives, 
ݍ∗௧௝ = ߙ௞݁∗௧௝൫ ௧ܺ௝ −݉௧௝݁∗௧௝൯                         (4b) 
 
The profit maximization problem for a jth subsistence fisher (for both types-efficient 
and inefficient) is; 
Max ߨ௦௝ =  ௦ܲ .ߚ௞݁௦௝ܣ௦௝ − ܶܨܥ௦ − ܿ௦݁௦௝                                     (5) 
I replace the stock ܣ௦௝  by ܣ௦௝ = ܺ௦௝ − ݊௦௝݁௦௝ 
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Here ܺ௦௝ is the initial stock less the harvest by all other subsistence fishers except the 
jth subsistence fisher and ݊௦௝݁௦௝  is the harvest by jth subsistence fisher. Fishers 
maximize their profits by choosing the optimum effort levels represented by, 
Max ߨ௦௝ =  ௦ܲ .ߚ௞݁௦௝(ܺ௦௝ − ݊௦௝݁௦௝) − ܶܨܥ௦ − ܿ௦݁௦௝  
ߨ௦௝ = ௦ܲߚ௞݁௦௝ܺ௦௝ − ௦ܲߚ௞݊௦௝݁௦௝ଶ − ܶܨܥ௦ − ܿ௦݁௦௝  
∆ߨ௦௝
∆݁௦௝
= ௦ܲߚ௞ܺ௦௝ − 2 ௦ܲߚ௞݊௦௝݁௦௝ − ܿ௦ = 0 
݁∗௦௝ = ௑ೞೕି ೎ೞುೞഁೖଶ௡ೞೕ                                                      (5a) 
I plug the ݁∗௦௝  to the harvest function and it gives, 
ݍ∗௦௝ = ߚ௞݁∗௦௝൫ܺ௦௝ − ݊௦௝݁∗௦௝൯                        (5b) 
 
However, because of the by-catch by trawlers, subsistence fishers will not be 
able to harvest the optimum level of fish they have caught before. The new effort and 
the quantity harvest by a subsistence fisher are: 
(new stock function is, ܣ௦௝ = ܺ௦௝ − ݊௦௝݁௦௝ − ܾ݉݁௧; we deduct the amount of by-catch 
(ܾ݉݁௧ = ܤ) from the previous available stock) 
Max ߨ௦௝ =  ௦ܲ .ߚ௞݁௦௝(ܺ௦௝ − ݊௦௝݁௦௝ − ܤ) − ܶܨܥ௦ − ܿ௦݁௦௝            (6) 
ߨ௦௝ = ௦ܲߚ௞݁௦௝ܺ௦௝ − ௦ܲߚ௞݊௦௝݁௦௝ଶ − ௦ܲߚ௞݁௦௝ܤ − ܶܨܥ௦ − ܿ௦݁௦௝  
∆ߨ௦௝
∆݁௦௝
= ௦ܲߚ௞ܺ௦௝ − 2 ௦ܲߚ௞݊௦௝݁௦௝ − ௦ܲߚ௞ܤ − ܿ௦ = 0 
݁௦௝ = ௑ೞೕି஻ି ೎ೞುೞഁೖଶ௡ೞೕ                                              (6a) 
I plug the ݁௦௝  to the harvest function and it gives, 
ݍ௦௝ = ߚ௞݁௦௝൫ܺ௦௝ − ݊௦௝݁௦௝ − ܤ൯                      (6b) 
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From 6b, it is evident that subsistence fishers catch less fish (ݍ∗௦௝ > ݍ௦௝) due to the 
by-catch by trawlers. This leads to a profit loss to the subsistence fishers. Since the 
target fish stock of the subsistence fishers is under the threat of depletion, a policy 
should be in place to put a cap on the harvest and to allow the stock to regenerate. The 
policy should reduce the by-catch and at the same time reduce the aggregate harvest 
by the subsistence fishers to a certain level. Thus, in the next section we consider 
imposing two TACs on trawlers and subsistence fishers to regulate the two segmented 
markets. 
 
Post TAC condition: 
 As subsistence fishers and trawlers catch different species of fish, TAC for 
subsistence fishers is different from TAC for trawlers. We name those two TACs as 
TAC-T (TAC on trawlers) and TAC-S (TAC on subsistence fishers). These TACs 
depend on the damage to the stock of the target species by the respective fishers.  
 
i) Effect of TAC on subsistence fishers 
If the TAC-T leads to a reduction in the by-catch, then there will be more fish 
available for subsistence fishers. Given the availability of more fish to subsistence 
fishers, the competition among subsistence fishers can potentially decrease if the 
reduction in by-catch makes subsistence fishers harvest more than what they 
harvested in the pre-quota condition (ݍ௦௝). Given the availability of more fish, 
subsistence fishers might over fish in the long-run due to the overcapitalization of the 
resource. TAC-S will resolve the problem of over fishing by the subsistence fishers in 
the long-run. With the reduction in by-catch, TAC-S can be relaxed in the long-run 
once the target fish stock of subsistence fishers regenerate to the corresponding 
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sustainable yield level. On the other hand reduction in the supply will increase the 
prices of subsistence fishers. Thus, profits of the subsistence fishers might increase 
than the status quo profits. In this scenario TAC policy will achieve the goal of 
reducing over-fishing problem and also can reduce the competitive pressures among 
subsistence fishers. 
 
ii) Effect of TAC on trawler fishers 
 The implementation of TAC-T policy will limit the total fish catch by the 
trawlers. Thus, efficient fishers in the group are able to harvest in a way to reach the 
TAC-T leaving very little fish for the inefficient fishers. TAC on trawlers will 
increase the competition among trawler fishers. Decrease in the total supply of fish by 
the trawlers will lead to increase in prices trawlers received by the middlemen. Profits 
of the trawlers depend on the net effect of efforts, quantity harvest and the increase in 
prices. However, even though the TAC reduces the overfishing problem and the by-
catch by trawlers, TAC-T will increase competition among the trawlers leaving 
inefficient fishers worse off.  
 
iii) Effect of TAC on middlemen and the consumers 
 Reduction in the aggregate supply by the trawlers and the subsistence fishers 
due to the TACs will increase the prices middlemen offer to the subsistence fishers 
and the trawlers, and that will negatively impact the profits of the middlemen. 
Decrease in aggregate supply will increase the prices middlemen receive in the local 
and Kolkata markets and that positively impact the profits of the middleman (Figure 
4.2). The profits of the middlemen depend on the net effect of price offered to the 
fishermen and price received by the middlemen in the local/Kolkata market. Increase 
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in prices in the local/Kolkata market will negatively impact the consumers. Figure 4.2 
illustrate the price increase from ܲ∗ to ்ܲ஺஼   with the cap on total harvest which is the 
TAC. 
 Even though the TAC policy can achieve the goal of reducing fish stock 
depletion, it can potentially increase the race for fish among efficient and inefficient 
fishers. Thus, we focus on a policy which can assign entitlements to each fisher in the 
group to secure their harvesting rights and to benefit the inefficient and efficient 
fishers simultaneously. Thus, in the next section we focus on proposing a TAC-ITQ 
policy for the two groups of fishers in the Digha setting and analyzing the welfare 
effects for industry participants.  
 
Post-TAC-ITQ condition: 
 Implementation of ITQs with a TAC will reduce the total catch owing to the 
presence of the TAC and reduce the race for fish as all the fishers in a group get rights 
to harvest a specific amount of fish for a given period of time. However, assigning 
entitlements for each fisher have a drawback to the efficient fishers.  
 
Figure 4.2: Price Fluctuation with the TAC Policy 
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The reason is even the efficient fishers have the ability to harvest more; the ITQs does 
not allow them to catch more due to the quota and leads to underutilize the capacity. 
The transferability of the quota addresses the drawback of underutilization of the 
capacity by efficient fishers. Allowing trade of quota between efficient and inefficient 
fishers will allow fishers to decide how much each fisher will participate in fishing. 
The decisions depend on the net benefit for each fisher by trading quota and the 
harvesting. In the Digha fishery, since trawlers and subsistence fishers target different 
species of fish, ITQs can be only traded within the group (i.e. subsistence fishers can 
only trade quota among subsistence fishers and trawlers can trade only among 
trawlers).  
Assumptions: 
 Each subsistence fisher gets a same proportion of TAC-S as the initial quota 
allocation-individual quota (ݓ௦). Similarly each trawler gets a same portion of 
TAC-T as the initial quota allocation (ݓ௧). 
 Maximum seasonal length is ௠ܶ௔௫ .  
 
 The profit function for a jth fisher following Matulich and Sever (1999) is (to 
show the effects of the ITQ policy, I specify the profit function explicitly in terms of 
quantity), 
Max ߨ௜௝ =  ௜்ܲ஺஼ݍ௜௝ − ܶܨܥ௜ − ܿ௜ݍ௜௝ − ݒ௜ݓపఫ́                                   (7)  
“i” implies the subsistence fisher group or trawler fisher group. ௜்ܲ஺஼  is the price 
subsistence fisher/trawler fisher receives after the TAC-ITQ implementation. ݍ௜௝ is the 
quantity harvested by the each fisherman. ܿ௜ is the average variable cost of effort by a 
subsistence fisher/trawler (average variable cost of effort of a trawler fisher is less 
than the average variable cost of a subsistence fisher). ݒ௜ is the price of quota in the 
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subsistence fisher group/trawler fisher group. ݓపఫ́  is the amount of quota that is bought 
or sold out by a jth fisher in fisher group i. If the quota is purchased ݓపఫ́ > 0  and if the 
quota is sold out ݓపఫ́ < 0 .  This implies purchasing of quota negatively affects the 
profits and selling of quota positively affects the profits. The constraint for quantity 
harvest is, ݍ௜௝ = ݓ௜ + ݓపఫ́ . This implies, the quantity harvest should be less than or 
equal to the sum of initial quota allocation and the purchased/sold quota.  
 Fishers maximize the profit with respect to quantity and it gives, 
Max ߨ௜௝ =  ௜்ܲ஺஼ݍ௜௝ − ܶܨܥ௜ − ܿ௜ݍ௜௝ − ݒ௜ݓపఫ́  
I replace ݓపఫ́  with (ݍ௜௝ −ݓ௜) 
Max ߨ௜௝ =  ௜்ܲ஺஼ݍ௜௝ − ܶܨܥ௜ − ܿ௜ݍ௜௝ − ݒ௜൫ݍ௜௝ − ݓ௜൯                     (8) 
∆ߨ௜௝
∆ݍ௜௝
= ௜்ܲ஺஼ − ܿ௜ − ݒ௜ = 0  
௜ܲ
்஺஼ − ܿ௜௞ = ݒ௜                                            (8a) 
Note: the quota is tradable only within the group since two groups target different 
species. Thus ܿ௜௞ is the marginal cost where “i” represents the subsistence and trawler 
fisher group and “k” represents the efficient and inefficient fishers within a group. 
Here, ௜்ܲ஺஼ − ܿ௜௞ = ݒ௜ implies fishers participate in the harvesting if the marginal 
benefit from fishing is greater than or equal to the market price of quota. Thus, 
allowing trading of quota is an efficient way of managing the fishing efforts by the 
fishers (inefficient fishers can sell the quota and reduce their fishing efforts while 
efficient fishers can get the maximum advantage by harvesting to their full capacity 
by buying the quota). 
 
 
 
58 
 
4.4 Results and Conclusion 
Given the constraints and context of Digha setting, TAC with an ITQ could be 
a better fit since the subsistence fishers are already in a greater competition to harvest 
intensively. ITQs with TAC will tackle both issues of depletion of fish stock and the 
competition among fishers. Thus, the TAC-ITQ policy will achieve the government 
objective of improving the efficiency of fishery industry in Digha area. In other words 
TAC-ITQ provides a solution to manage fisheries in developing nations by reducing 
the environmental damages associated with over fishing, which would improve social 
welfare. 
If the TAC on trawlers reduces the by-catch, assigning two TACs for both 
groups is the best way to manage two segments of the market. Also the reduction in 
the by-catch would allow relaxing the TAC on subsistence fishers once the target 
stock of the subsistence fishers reach the level corresponds to sustainable yield level. 
If the TAC-T is not large enough to reduce the by-catch, there should be a different 
policy implication to reduce the by-catch by trawlers.  
The TAC with ITQs policy will also impact the prices middlemen offer to the 
fishers and the prices middlemen receive in the local/Kolkata market as well. Thus, it 
is important to evaluate the impact of the policy in terms of all industry participants 
while resolving the problem of stock depletion and competitive pressures of fishers. 
Also it is important to compare the rents for industry participants before and after the 
policy implementation. Even though the policy achieves its goals, the individuals who 
have been better off without the policy might be worse off after implementing the 
policy. Also compared to the status quo, the rents of the individuals might be reduced 
after the implementation of the policy, even though the policy achieves its goals (i.e. 
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if the TAC for subsistence fishers is very low since the stock for low value fish is 
more depleted due to the by-catch, TAC might worsen the poor fishers).  
 
4.5 Challenges of Implementing the Policies and Suggestions 
 As discussed in previous chapters, results of the welfare analysis for industry 
participants is not sufficient to decide if the policy is feasible to implement in the 
specific setting. There are issues related to each setting. One issue is not having 
accurate data on historical catches and prices which is important to design TAC and 
ITQs. Second major issue is lack of resources, political instability and inappropriate 
institutional arrangements in developing countries to implement the policy and 
monitoring to see if the policy works in the setting. However, this model makes a case 
for implementing the TAC-ITQ policy among fishermen to see how this enables 
policy makers and researchers to carry out an informed cost benefit analysis in the 
developing country fisheries sector.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Fish species and total catch by trawlers (GN), motor boat (OM) 
and row boat (NM) fishers 
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APPENDIX B 
Questionnaire 
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